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Introduction
Ever since Berle and Means (1932) stated that in the modern corporation hired managers have enough discretion for corporate plundering, the issue of separating ownership from control and its resulting impact on firm performance has been placed high on the agenda of economists.
Globalizing product and financial markets have recently triggered renewed interest in the link
between corporate governance and performance among academics and business press. As firms face new challenges from increased cross-border competition, pressures to adapt to a new internationally integrated environment mount. Thus, the question currently being debated in Europe and in the USA is whether established systems of corporate finance and corporate control are still appropriate to cope with the challenges ahead. 1 A prime element of corporate governance is the alignment of shareholders'
interests with the interests of managers hired to run the firm. In this respect the Anglo-American system relies heavily on the market mechanism to channel the flow of capital, to control its efficient use, and to assure investors of maximizing the return on their investments. Active markets for corporate control function as a disciplinary mechanism to sanction badly performing firms. The threat of corporate takeovers is supposed to reign in free-wheeling managers. 2 As markets for equity capital are highly liquid, dissatisfied shareholders can easily sell off their holdings. The benefits typically attributed to this so-called market-based system are seen in a better provision of finance to innovative start-up firms and higher returns to investors. The 3 system, however, has been criticized for short-termism, neglect of interests other than shareholders', and inefficiency in delivering effective corporate governance. 3 In the literature on managerial discretion and agency costs it has been argued that the presence of a large shareholder reduces agency costs because a high stake in the firm makes it the shareholder's very interest to control the executive managers hired to run the firm. 4 Ownership concentration thus may be the key to effective corporate governance and shareholder value maximization.
Concentrated ownership is a salient feature of the German system of corporate governance. 5 German corporations tend to have only one large blockholder who often commands a super-majority interest. Small and medium-sized firms, preferably organized as private partnerships or limited liability corporations, are typically majority-owned by individuals (families) or are subsidiaries of large firms. Joint stock corporations with widely dispersed outside shareholdings, as is common in the USA or the UK, are very rare. 6 The German stock market is still of relatively small size regarding listings and market capitalization. 7 Ownership structures are observed to be unchanged over decades, since large shareholders tend to stick to their blockholdings even in times of very bad corporate performance. Further, close ties between industrial firms and financial institutions (banks) (e.g. via cross-shareholdings, long-term lenderborrower relations) seem to foster access to debt capital, thus reducing the need to attract equity capital via the stock market. The network-like structure of the German system has effectively thwarted any serious attempts of (un)friendly take-overs. An active market for corporate control rights does not exist despite the recent take-over battle between Mannesmann and Vodafone.
However, in view of high unemployment and sluggish growth critics see the network-orientation as a root cause for entrepreneurial inertia, risk aversion, and low investment in emerging new technologies or infant industries. It has been recommended to dispose of the German system of corporate governance or, at least, modify it by incorporating elements of the market-based Anglo-American system. As noted by Mayer (1996) , "Despite the intense debate, evidence on the effects of different governance systems is still sparse." Most of the available empirical evidence on the governance-performance link is based on Anglo-Saxon data. Therefore, the present paper aims to contribute to the on-going corporate governance debate by providing empirical evidence on German corporations. We investigate the impact of corporate governance indicators such as ownership concentration, stock market exposure, board representation of owners, and the location of control rights on profitability. In Section 2, the link between corporate governance and firm performance as well as previous empirical evidence on Germany are discussed in more detail. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis for a panel data set of 361 German corporations over the time period 1991 to 1996. In Section 4, we summarize and conclude. In particular, we find that ownership concentration affects profitability significantly negatively. However, this result significantly depends on both stock market exposure and the location of control rights.
The Governed Corporation and Profitability
The major concern in the debate on the separation of ownership and control is whether managers of widely-held corporations pursue their own interests (pet projects, empire building, perks etc.) rather than maximizing shareholder value. Managers may not be adequately controlled by shareholders because monitoring managers is expensive for an individual shareholder if he only commands a negligible share in the firm. An extensive literature has discussed the pros and cons of separating ownership from control. 9 Most recently, the market-based system of corporate governance has again been seriously questioned by prominent scholars such as Porter (1992) , Jensen (1993) , Roe (1994b ), or Pound (1995 arguing for more shareholder activism. 
The governed vs. the managed corporation
A corporation with free-wheeling managers in charge of decision-making and, more or less, controlling themselves is very much the image of the manager-controlled or managed corporation Pound (1995) contrasts with the so-called governed corporation which he praises as the ideal governance model for restructuring not only corporate America.
The main difference between managed and governed lies in the role the owners of a company play in monitoring and disciplining the management. The managed corporation is characterized by a clear separation of control and ownership. Senior management is in charge of decision-making. The supervisory board is responsible for selecting and monitoring senior managers, and replacing them in case of bad performance. The shareholders participate only insofar as they can oust the supervisory board in a joint voting effort if the corporation does not perform as expected. However, as monitoring and controlling efforts of any one shareholder benefit all others, the free rider problem makes it expensive and unattractive for a small shareholder to exercise and enforce voting rights. Moreover, coordinating a large number of different shareholders for joint voting is difficult or even impossible. In times of crisis, shareholders may then "prefer a cheap 'exit' to an expensive 'voice' " (Bhide 1994, p. 132) .
Further, corporate supervisory boards may be inefficient or 'entrenched' monitors. As Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) find, boards only take action when true performance disasters have already happened. 10 Thus, Pound (1995, p. 92) claims that inadequate governance is inherent to the managed corporation and "allows mistakes to go uncorrected until they become catastrophes".
For a corporation to be governed in the sense of Pound, investors must be different from the investors of a managed corporation. "Active" (Jensen 1993, p. 866) or "relationship" (Thompson 1998, p. 27) investors are called for: investors not selling out quickly in times of trouble because they are convinced that the company is being soundly managed and that their interests and concerns are taken seriously by the management. The emphasis in the model of the governed corporation is not on shareholders monitoring the managers more closely 6 than in the managed corporation but on active participation of committed owners in the firm's decision-making process. Active participation means in the first place being involved in selecting the top management and initiating replacements in case of inferior performance.
However, for having one's interests and concerns respected, a relationship investor needs to be a large shareholder as well, i.e., he must have sufficient control over the firm's assets. 11 Only investors who control a substantial part of the voting capital will be able to keep managers from diverting free cash flow into pet projects and force them to distribute profits to shareholders.
Pound's image of the governed corporation thus suggests that the stakes in a firm should be concentrated in the hands of only a few shareholders. Implicitly it is claimed that by reintegrating ownership and control corporate performance (profitability, productivity, innovative thrust etc.) is going to be enhanced. Demsetz (1983) has not been convinced of the arguments put forward by Berle Mayer (1996, p. 12 ) is concerned that a close relationship between large shareholders and managers may prevent these large investors from taking necessary action in situations, "where investors' reputations may suffer as a consequence of attempts to dismiss management".
As argued by Cubbin and Leech (1983) , the location of control rights may be a more important determinant of the degree of control to be exerted by owners than the degree of ownership concentration. Internal control, or 'insider' control (Mayer 1996) , may represent a higher degree of control at any given level of blockholdings than external, or 'outsider', control.
Family interests, allied industrial firms, banks, and holdings companies are understood as 'insiders', while the shareholders of diffusely held firms are seen as 'outsiders'. In addition, differences in commitment to a firm may emerge between individuals or families as owners (who often are the company founders) and ownership by industrial firms or financial institutions.
Therefore, the location of control rights, respectively the identity of owners, may matter even more. Under the German system of corporate governance with its high ownership concentration, large shareholders may be the insiders or committed investors imagined by Pound and others, exercising internal control by sitting on supervisory boards or by posing the CEO.
To sum up, the debate on the managed versus the governed corporation, or the insider versus the outsider model of the corporate governance, has generated conflicting hypotheses concerning the link between ownership, control, and firm performance. 
Empirical evidence
The existing empirical evidence refers almost exclusively to the Anglo-Saxon countries and does not allow for clear-cut answers. Short (1994, p. 227) concludes that the studies surveyed by her "do not provide conclusive evidence either in support of, or in opposition to, the hypothesis that the ownership and control structures of firms materially affect their performance." Mayer (1996, p. 17) interprets the empirical evidence as implying that there are "benefits in the exercise of corporate governance from modest levels of concentrations of ownership", but that at high levels of ownership concentration "exploitation of private benefits" may result.
Despite differences in corporate governance systems have been highlighted to potentially translate into profitability differences, only a few empirical studies have investigated the potential impact of governance indicators on performance for German firms. In a pioneering study, Thonet and Poensgen (1979) found significantly lower returns on equity for ownercontrolled than for manager-controlled quoted stock corporations. A firm was defined as ownercontrolled if individuals or families held at least the blocking minority (25% plus one vote of the voting capital). The major deficiency of the study is that ownership structures were identifiable only for about 90 of the 300 firms. Thus in the regression analysis owner-controlled firms had to be compared to a mixture of presumably manager-controlled firms and firms with unknown governance structures, rendering the results questionable.
The studies of Cable (1985) , Schmid (1996) , Chirinko and Elston (1996) , and
Weigand (1999) focused on banks as blockholders in industrial firms. Cable (1985) employed a very small sample of 48 stock corporations from Germany's 100 largest corporations in 1970.
The cross-section regression for the time period 1968 to 1972 yielded a significantly positive impact of bank involvement on profitability. A similar result is reported by Schmid (1996) for the years 1974 and 1985. Chirinko and Elston (1996) Rather, concentration of ownership may be "used to extract private benefits rather than wider shareholder interests" (1997, p. 17).
Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) studied the blockholdings-performance link for the largest firms from five major industrialized countries. For the 99 publicly traded German stock corporations incorporated in their sample they estimated a significantly negative and nonlinear impact of ownership concentration (measured by the percentage of shares outstanding held by the largest shareholder) on the return on total assets over the period 1986 to 1991. Thus profitability first decreases in ownership concentration and then, at higher levels of concentration, rises again. 13 Goergen (1999) ownership and profitability has changed over the decades examined. A significant positive relationship seems to have existed for "governed" (owner-controlled) firms during the 1970s and early 1980s (Cable, Schmid, Weigand) , whereas the relationship vanishes or is even inverse when the late 1980s and the 1990s are included (Becht, Chirinko and Elston, Franks and Mayer, Goergen, Gedajlovic and Shapiro) . The opening of markets and increased international competition may have altered the profitability-ownership concentration relation since the late 1980s. To explore this conjecture we will study the ownership-profitability issue using a large panel data set for the 1990s. To control for the importance of stock market exposure, we have included non-quoted stock corporations as well as limited liability companies.
Data, variables, and sample characteristics
The data set used in the subsequent analysis contains 361 firms from the German mining and manufacturing industries. The time period covered is 1991 to 1996, which yielded the largest number of reporting firms with complete and consistent data. In this study, we use the return on total assets (ROA) as an indicator of corporate performance. In the descriptive tables we will also report the return on equity (ROE). Our preferred measure of firm performance is however ROA, since ROE comparisons across firms may be distorted by the leverage effect and differences in the user cost of capital. In either case, the nominator of ROA and ROE is gross profits, calculated from firms' profit-and-lossstatements as sales revenue minus expenses for personnel and materials. This definition is equivalent to earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation. Equity capital is defined as shareholders' equity plus reserves, which also include pension liabilities. Pension liabilities are added for two reasons. First, it is peculiar to the German system of accounting that pension assets and pension liabilities are not netted out in companies' balance sheets. Further, pension liabilities are not paid into a trust (pension fund) but remain within the firm. They are available to the firm as a source of internal long-term finance. Pension liabilities thus can be seen as 'quasi' equity. Second, the shareholders' equity of limited liablity companies (GmbH) is, by legal construction, extremely low. Adding reserves and pension liabilities to shareholders' equity helps avoid generating unrealistically high returns on equity for these firms compared to stock corporations.
To identify owners, share distributions, and composition of managing and supervisory boards we used investors' handbooks on German companies edited by two German 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994) , Bayerische Hypotheken-und Wechselbank ("Hypo-Guide") Wegweiser durch deutsche
Aktiengesellschaften (Guide of German Stock Corporations, annual issues 1988 , and
Hoppenstedt's Börsenführer (annual issues 1988-1996) . In combining these data sources it was possible to obtain a rather precise picture of voting stock ownership. In particular, in many cases the Hypo-Guide also lists blocks smaller than 25% and indicates indirect ownership (voting rights granted to a large shareholder from others shareholders). Sometimes even very small blockholdings (below 5%) are reported. For the purposes of this study, we have defined a 'large'
shareholder as one who controls at least 5 per cent of a firm's voting capital. This cut-off point of when a shareholder is large rather than small is not of so much relevance as it is in Anglo-Saxon studies 14 , since almost all firms have large shareholders who control at least 25 percent of the voting capital. As Table 1 shows, 65% of the companies in the sample have one large shareholder who, on average, controls 89% of the voting stocks and faces a group of small shareholders with an aggregated share in the voting capital of 11%.
The degree of ownership concentration is the standard measure used in the empirical literature to account for the extent of "governance" exercised by the owners of a firms.
In this study as in previous ones, ownership concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index of outstanding voting stock and, alternatively, by the percentage stake of the largest shareholder.
The share of the largest shareholder indicates her fundamental voting power, that is, the ability to outvote other shareholders or initiate major changes by herself (e.g., ousting the supervisors, introduce a new corporate charter). The Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of squared an industrial firm sold its stake in a firm completely to another industrial firm we treated such a transfer of shareholdings not as a change in the location of control rights, since the new owner again belonged to the same owner category. If, however, the owning industrial firm sold only part of its holdings to another industrial firm so that the new co-owner could be seen as an additional large shareholder we counted such a transfer as "change" (from INDFIRM to MIX).
The groups are mutually exclusive, that is, a firm that had as an identified shareholder, for example, another industrial firm in some years and a bank in other years only appears in the CHANGE group but not in the groups INDFIRM or FININST. Due to the lack of detailed owner information, the foreign-owned firms were also treated as a separate sub-group. A few firms are owned by foundations which have no owner in a strict sense. It is thus unclear who really controls decisions. However, since these foundations are close to the founding families of these 14 firms, as in the case of Bosch GmbH (a leading electronic products firm), it is not unreasonable to classify them to the group of firms controlled by families or voting pools of individuals. The group of firms with widely dispersed shareholdings seems to be missing. We have 15 stock corporations in the sample for which more than 75% of voting capital is dispersedly held. The following firms from our sample can be seen as "widely dispersed" (average aggregated share of dispersed holdings 1991-96 in brackets): Bayer (92.00%), Mannesmann (100.00%), Schering (92.80%), Siemens (91.70%), and VEBA (96.70%). However, the study of Baums and Fraune (1995) shows that in the 1992 annual shareholders' meetings banks controlled an aggregate of more than 90% of these firms' voting capital via associated investment companies and proxy votes. The firms were therefore added to the group of firms with financial institutions as largest shareholders. However, since this information on aggregated proxy voting rights was only available for one year we have not used it in the calculation of the Herfindahl-index itself but rather as qualitative information for classifying firms. Table 2 gives the details of the group definitions and examples of firms classified as well as definitions of all other variables used in this study. potentially managed, since the largest shareholder tends to be -at least for German standards -a dispersedly held large stock corporation. However, we make no attempt here to argue that a certain location of control rights indeed implies "more"or "less" effective governance. Without conducting in-depth case studies on each firm a case for insiders as owners to be more "committed" or "active" investors can hardly be made. It is therefore not entirely clear whether these owners really "govern", or whether hired managers nonetheless exercise control even if ownership concentration is high and firms are owned by families, for example.
To investigate whether stock market exposure makes a difference for the potential link between governance indicators and corporate performance we distinguish between corporations traded on the stock exchange (QUOTED) and non-traded or non-stock corporations (NON-QUOTED). Table 3A presents the mean and median values of selected variables for the full sample and the sub-samples of quoted and non-quoted firms. Comparing the groups of quoted and non-quoted firms, the last column reports statistics of testing the hypotheses of equal group means (t-statistic) and medians (Mann-Whithney statistic). Quoted firms have significantly higher average returns on total assets and also higher median returns on equity. The quoted firms are less levered. Further, as measured by sales, employment, and the log of total assets, the quoted firms are substantially larger on average but the median firms do not differ significantly in sales or total assets. Finally, quoted firms realized significantly higher growth of turnover than non-quoted firms. 
Regression model and hypotheses
To investigate the impact of the mode of corporate governance on corporate performance we use the following empirical model consisting of two panel regression equations In regression (1), the return on total assets, ROA, is regressed on ownership concentration OC and a set of other variables. For lucidity and space restrictions we will only present results using the unbounded Herfindahl index as in Demsetz and Lehn (1985) . 17 B
indicates the presence of the largest shareholder on the executive board. The following variables, well-known from the industrial organization literature on the determinants of profitability, serve as right-hand side control variables: absolute firm size S (natural logarithm of total assets), firm growth G (logarithmic annual change in turnover), capital intensity K (tangible assets divided by the number of employees), capital structure C (shareholders' equity plus reserves divided by total capital), and the Herfindahl index of supplier concentration at the two-digit industry level (source: German Statistical Office). These variabes will be discussed in more detail below. The regression equation further includes firm-specific effects i a , time-specific effects t λ , and a classical regression error term it ε . The firm-and time-specific effects are supposed to control for systematic variation in profitability not captured by the independent variables (e.g., differences
in risk taking or in the cost of capital).
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As hypothesized by Demsetz, in active and well-functioning markets for corporate control rights ownership concentration and profitability should be simultaneously determined. To test for simultaneity bias in regression equation (1) we "endogenize" ownership concentration in regression equation (1) and estimate (1) and (2) by applying standard instrumental variable techniques (2SLS). As theory is still rather silent on potential determinants of ownership concentration, regression equation (2) is an ad-hoc specification. 19 In the reducedform regression we regress ownership concentration on all other right-hand side variables in (1) plus the number of large shareholders, N LS . In the second-stage regression, we employ in (1) and (2) profitability. An extensive empirical literature has examined, and overwhelmingly supported, the positive profitability-concentration relation. 23 We therefore expect 0 7 > b . As it is not the concern of this paper to discuss the appropriate interpretation of the relationship, we take market concentration as a summary measure of industry characteristics, reflecting technology (potential scale economies), demand (price elasticity) as well as the intensity of competition.
The regression equations are estimated using a GLS panel estimator described in Hsiao (1986, pp. 55 ) which allows for heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation of the regression residuals. 
Results
Ownership concentration, stock market exposure, and profitability Table 4A contains the coefficient estimates for the profitability regression. Column 1 reports the regression coefficients using the full sample of firms. Column 2 presents the estimates for the quoted firms, while column 3 gives the coefficient differences with respect to the (not separately reported) regression coefficients of the non-quoted firms. Ownership concentration affects ROA significantly negative. This negative impact of ownership concentration is somewhat weaker for the quoted (-0.0024) than for the non-quoted firms (-0.0051) but the coefficient difference (-0.0031) is not statistically significant. The coefficient on board representation of the largest shareholder is insignificantly negative (and remains so when ownership concentration is excluded from the regressions). Larger firms and firms with a higher share of equity capital (lower leverage) have significantly lower returns, which is consistent with risk-return considerations. Firm growth and market concentration affect ROA positively. Firm-specific effects are highly significant, implying that there are systematic firm-specific influences not captured by the included right-hand side variables. Time-specific effects are insignificant as long as capital intensity is included in the regression but become highly significant when capital intensity is excluded. Our measure of capital intensity thus seems to pick up cyclical effects (capital utilization). The Hausman test confirms that the firm-and time-specific effects are fixed (constant) rather than random(ly distributed across firms). Hausman test statistic is highly significant so that there is simultaneity bias. Therefore, ROA cannot be assumed exogenous in the ownership concentration regression.
Tables 4A and 4B

The Identity of Owners
Considering the location of control rights Table 5A gives some new insights. 25 The group of firms owned by another industrial firm, INDFIRM, is taken as the base group. Column 1 presents the regression coefficients for this base group, whereas the following columns contain the estimates of coefficient differences with respect to the other groups of owners. The coefficient on ownership concentration is positive but insignificant for the INDFIRM firms. For these firms, which might be managed rather than governed, ownership concentration has no systematic effect on ROA. The negative impact of ownership concentration found for the full sample of firms can be traced back to the firms owned, and possibly governed, by FAMILY and MIX. For the MIX firms the negative coefficient suggests that larger asymmetries in shareholders' stakes translate into lower profitability. In other words, the presence of a strong second or third large shareholder enhances profitability. A negative but insignificant effect also turns up for the firms owned by foreigners and the firms that experienced a change in owners.
Ownership concentration makes a significantly positive difference for firms potentially governed by financial institutions. In this group of firms ownership concentration is by far the lowest (see 21   Table 3B ). By German standards, these firms can almost be defined as "dispersedly held".
Finally, Table 5B extends the analysis to taking stock market exposure into account. Now it becomes clear that the negative ownership concentration effect results particularly from the nonquoted firms owned by families (individuals, foundations) or foreigners but also from quoted firms which have different large shareholders.
Summary and conclusion
Almost a decade ago Michael C. Jensen (1993, p. 873) This paper contributes to the positive approach. We focused on German firms because ownership concentration is an important feature setting the German system of corporate governance apart from the Anglo-Saxon. In the corporate governance literature ownership concentration is often understood as reflecting a stronger governing effort of owners. By reducing informational asymmetries between owners and managers as well as between the firm and external investors ownership concentration is expected to affect firm profitability positively. Contrary to this argument, we find a significantly negative impact of ownership concentration on profitability as measured by the return on total assets.
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Ownership concentration can be an insufficient or misleading indicator of the control that owners actually exert. We therefore checked further governance indicators.
Representation of the largest shareholder on the board of executive directors did not turn out to make a significant difference for profitability. However, the profitability-ownership concentration relation depends on both stock market exposure and the location of control rights.
The negative effect of ownership concentration could be traced back to family-or foreign-owned non-quoted firms as well as quoted firms with different large shareholders. A positive impact of ownership concentration on profitability, supportive of managerial discretion and agency theories, showed up for quoted firms which have financial institutions as large shareholders.
Further, simple group comparisons of mean and median profitability (ROA, ROE) imply that stock market exposure is profitability-enhancing.
Finally, we have to answer the question posed in this paper: Does the governed corporation perform better? If one is willing to view firms owned by families, financial institutions, or a mix of large shareholders as (potentially) governed rather than managed, the answer to the question seems to be yes. These groups had significantly higher mean and median profitabilities than the group of firms owned by another industrial firm. These results raise more questions than they answer. First, why are profitability differences between the group of firms owned by another industrial firm and all other groups so pronounced? Do the owning firms extract rents by e.g. charging high transfer prices from the owned firms? Second, significant profitability differences also exist between the different groups of firms that may be governed.
What cuases these differences? Third, industry characteristics such as the underlying technology and knowledge conditions may simultaneously determine governance structures, investment, and profitability. 26 In industries such as optical instruments or machinery, production technology and the knowledge on which firm know-how is based does not require large firm sizes per se, that is, cost advantages (scale economies) from large-scale operations (production, R&D) are not ubiquitous. Therefore, these industries offer a favorable environment for smaller firms, and indeed that is where we find small family-owned firms to be very common. By contrast, in the 23 chemical and pharmaceutical industry stock corporations dominate. Clearly, production technologies require large firm sizes. Different ownership structures are also necessary to satisfy the increased capital needs and to spread the higher risk involved in large-scale operations. To get a more comprehensive picture of the impact of governance structures on firm performance, future research should focus on the link between industry characteristics, firm financing, investment, and profitability.
In sum, our study finds systematic influences of ownership concentration, stock market exposure, and the location of control rights on the profitability of German corporations.
Our main results imply that (1) the presence of large shareholders does not necessarily enhance profitability, and (2) concentrated ownership might be a sub-optimal choice for many of the tightly held German corporations.
institutional investors, being dissatisfied with the company's bad performance, wanted to negotiate the implementation of a new CEO with GM's leaders. The management could calmly decline the request − each 'large' shareholder only accounted for less than one per cent of the voting capital. In 1992 GM's top management had to take action after all. As losses piled up to over $6 billlion, CEO Robert Stempel was eventually fired. 12 Having large investors may entail costs of "straightforward expropriation of other investors, managers, and employees; inefficient expropriation through pursuit of personal (non-profit maximizing) objectives; and finally the incentive effects of expropriation on the other stakeholders" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, pp. 755) . 13 This U-formed relationship also turned up for the US firms in the sample. Coefficients were insignificantly negative for firms from the UK, France and Canada. 14 See the discussion in Short (1994, p. 216) . 15 As disclosure of smaller blockholdings was not mandatory during the observation period, the calculated Herfindahl index can only be an approximation to the true degree of ownership concentration. For corporations with missing information on this "dispersed" portion of shareholdings two alternative Herfindahl indices were constructed. One measure treats the "dispersed" portion as one block. Using the means in Table 1 for corporations with only one large shareholder as an example, the Herfindahl index is (89.07) 2 + (10.93) 2 = 8,053. The other measure assumes that the dispersed portion is equally distributed among an unknown number of shareholders, each holding at most 1% block of stocks, which yields a Herfindahl index of (89.07) 2 + 10×(1.00) 2 + (0.93) 2 = 7,944. 16 The results are available from the authors on request.
17 The Herfindahl-Index in its standard definition is restricted to take on values between 0 and 10,000. The logit transformation log [H/(10,000-H)] yields an "unbounded" variable. In the case of Mannesmann, for which ownership of voting shares is reported to be "100% dispersed", H was set at 1 in the transformation. For firms with only one owner holding 100% of voting stock, H was set at 9,999. In alternative regression runs we used the bounded Herfindahl-Index as well as the share of the largest shareholder plus its squared value as in Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) . Further, we replaced ROA by ROE. We also tested more parsimonious specifications, leaving out (some of) the variables implied by industrial organization theory. As the estimates with respect to governance indicators do not differ significantly, we do not report the results from these alternative specifications here. They are available from the authors on request. 18 See e.g. Hsiao (1986) or Baltagi (1995) for a comprehensive discussion of panel data models and appropriate estimation techniques. 19 See, however, the interesting theoretical approaches by Burkhart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) , Bolton and von Thadden (1998) as well as Pagano and Röell (1998) . 20 We tested alternative exclusions of variables, since picking a specific variable is -admittedlyarbitrary. The results, however, do not change significantly with respect to the governance indicators if any other variable is excluded. 21 See the argument advanced above in connection with quoted firms. 22 See the discussion in Hall and Weiss (1967) and Brealy and Myers (1984, pp. 362) .
30 23 See for discussion e.g. Scherer and Ross (1990) or Martin (1993) . 24 The procedure uses Within-OLS to obtain consistent first-step estimates. From the first-step residuals the serial correlation coefficient is estimated. The regression is then transformed to eliminate serial correlation and is re-estimated by GLS, applying White's (1980) procedure to obtain heteroskedaticity-robust standard errors. 25 As our specification tests show that the firm-and time-specific effects are fixed rather than random, we cannot consider the location-of-control-rights-groups directly in the panel regression by including dummy variables. The problem is that such indicator variables would vary across firms but not in time. Only for the firms included in CHANGE there would be time series variation. Time-invariable variables cannot be estimated in a fixed effects model because they are perfectly correlated with the fixed (i.e., time-constant) individual effects. See Baltagi (1995, p. 11) .
